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• Mid-January 1919 marked the start of the second stage of the uprising
• The battles for Rawicz (...)

The battles for Rawicz:3–4 and 5–6 February 1919. Both battles for Rawicz, as well as earlier battles in the vicinity of Poniec and Kąkolewo, were a part of clashes fought on the Southern and South-Western Fronts of the uprising. In February 1919, the Southern Front, commanded by Second Lieutenant Władysław Wawrzyniak, was divided into four sections: I (Górka) – commanded by Second Lieutenant Alfons Breza, II (Krotoszyn) – commanded by Second Lieutenant Marian Modrzejewski, III (Odolanów) – commanded by Sergeant Feliks Witecki and IV (Ostrzeszów) – commanded by Second Lieutenant Stanisław Thiel. On 13 February, Colonel Adolf Jan Kuczewski took command of the front. The total Polish forces on the front were approximately 2100 soldiers. In this section, the Germans involved the forces of the Leszno garrison. Furthermore, the following units were also stationed in the vicinity: the 6th Grenadier Regiment (formerly in Poznań, now in Rawicz), the 11th Grenadier Regiment (from Wrocław), the 37th Infantry Regiment (from Krotoszyn), a voluntary battalion of Hannover riflemen, the 1st Uhlan Regiment (from Milicz), the 4th Uhlan Regiment, the 5th Cuirassier Regiment, the 5th Heavy Artillery Regiment (formerly based in Poznań), an infantry battalion and 2 field artillery battalions in Międzybórz, a field artillery regiment of the Twardogóra guard, units from Kępno, Bralin and Słupia Kapitulna (250 people) and a group from Oleśnica. Despite the large number of units, it should be noted that in most cases the number of soldiers considerably differed from the number initially assumed by the commanders. The disproportion of the forces was very clear. The Polish decision on occupying Rawicz was rather of emotional and prestigious significance. The German forces in Rawicz and in its vicinity were commanded by General Kurt von dem Borne. On 23 January 1919, the Germans wanted to occupy Miejska Górka. Their attack, however, was a failure despite all their artillery, and the German side decided to limit its activity in this section to firing at Polish positions from cannons. Given the situation, the Poles decided to undertake offensive manoeuvres aimed at occupying Rawicz. In early February, German forces in the Rawicz-Leszno section comprised: the 6th and 11th Grenadier Regiments, the 37th Fusilier Regiment, the 50th Infantry Regiment (Leszno, Rawicz), the 56th Field (light) Artillery Regiment, the 5th Heavy Artillery Regiment and the 5th Sapper Battalion (Leszno). The composition of the Polish forces did not change. In accordance with a plan drawn up by the front’s Head of Staff, Zygmunt Wieliczka, the insurgents intended to take Łaszczyn and Dębno Polskie, cut the telegraph and railway connections and protect the town from a possible attack by German reinforcements that might be sent from Sarnowa, Bojanowo and Gierłachowo. The final plan of attack on Rawicz was, however, drawn up by Second Lieutenant Alfons Breza, who by that time was the Commander of the Rawicz section. Three assault groups were formed: Group 1 (approx. 260 people): the Zakrzewo company (commander: Wojciech Kozal, approx. 80 people), the 1st Jarocin Company (commander: Feliks Nadolski, approx. 114 people), the Jutrosin unit (approx. 40 people) and the Dubin unit (approx. 20 insurgents). Task: to attack Rawicz from the north, from the Zakrzewo - Kawcze region. Group 2 (approx. 330 insurgents): the Górka Battalion (commander: Konstanty Pietruszyński). Task: to attack in the Żołędnica - Niemarzyn belt, towards Sarnowa. Group 3 (approx. 500 soldiers): insurgent units from towns or villages such as Chojno, Golejewo, Słupia Kapitulna, Zielona Wieś and Koźmin. Task: to attack Dębno Polskie, Kąty and Szymanowo from Słupia Kapitulna and Zielona Wieś. The attack started during the night of 3 to 4 February. Despite initial successes, the occupation of Łaszczyn, Szymanowo and the reaching of the Rawicz suburbs, insurgent units withdrew back to their starting positions. The first battle for Rawicz was a defeat. After the events of 3 and 4 February 1919, both sides prepared themselves for another attack. The Germans were reinforced by units from Żmigrów, Leszno and Bojanowo, and temporarily from Oborniki Śląskie. 500 new insurgents came to the Rawicz section: the 3rd Jarocin Company (commander: Stanisław Krystofiak) and the 4th Jarocin Company (commander: Alojzy Nowak). Both Jarocin companies were commanded by Bronisław Kirchner. Also the 2nd Pleszew Company (commander: Antoni Kozłowicz) and the 2nd Koźmin Company (commander: Franciszek Ciesielski) joined. The front commanders, having learnt their lesson after the first battle of Rawicz, made the decision to occupy Rawicz during the night of 5 to 6 February. The line of the attack was to be 6 kilometres’ wide. The attack itself was divided into two stages: the occupation of Konarzewo, Łaszczyn and Sarnowa and an assault on Rawicz. A. Breza, however, made the unauthorised decision to occupy Dąbrówka as well, which extended the attack line to the north-east. His decision was one of the fundamental mistakes in the battle of 3-4 February. Forces attacked from the front, from several directions simultaneously. The attack of the 2nd company from Koźmin on Dąbrówka was unsuccessful, despite the fact that the soldiers managed to reach the edge of the village. The second, central group occupied Sarnówka and, after fierce fighting, also Sarnowa. However, the insurgents failed to keep the towns, because the commanders did not duly protect them; furthermore, the Pleszew company was mistakenly fired at by soldiers from the 1st Górka Company. In the meanwhile, the Germans took advantage of the fact that the insurgents left railway tracks undamaged, and made use of their armoured train. At the same time, on 7 February, soldiers from the Hannover Rifle Battalion and the 50th Infantry Regiment counter-attacked, with the support of the train. The Germans retook Sarnowa and forced the insurgents to withdraw from Sarnówka. It was only the 3rd Jarocin Company near Miejska Górka that managed to stop them. As a result, both battles of Rawicz did not change anything in the position of either of the sides. The extreme incompetence of the section commanders and repetitive mistakes committed, despite prior experience, resulted in bitterness and discouragement among the insurgents. The Górka battalion and the Pleszew company left. They were replaced by a battalion from Śrem (commander: Stefan Chosłowski) composed of approx. 550 well-organised, armed and disciplined soldiers. In the meantime, the Germans, encouraged by their victories, planned to attack the left flank of the Polish section on 10 February. To this end, they gathered the Hannover Rifle Battalion, which was given the task to attack the town of Stwolno. One battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment from Dębno Polskie was ordered to attack Zielona Wieś, while two companies of the 6th Grenadier Regiment from the region of Nowa Wieś were to occupy Wydawy, attacking it from the south. The last two groups were to receive cannon support from Dębno Polskie, Dębno (former Dębno Niemieckie) and Nowa Wieś. From a captured soldier, the Polish side learned about the German plans, the insurgents were therefore ready to repulse the attack. On 10 February, German artillery fire caused great losses among the town’s defendants. When the proper attack started, they managed to occupy Wydawy, Zielona Wieś and Stwolno. Near Zawady and Słupia Kapitulna, insurgents commanded by Marian Szulc and Michał Lorkiewicz successfully resisted the enemy. The Germans left Stwolno and Wydawy, and were pushed out of Zielona Wieś. For a bloody price (nearly 300 soldiers dead in both the battles of Rawicz), the insurgents held their positions.

The battles for Babimost and Kargowa, 11-12 February 1919. Following their offensive plan, on 11 February 1919, the Germans attacked Babimost and Kargowa. If the attack succeeded, they planned to attack further towards Wolsztyn. The following forces were involved in this task: the 38th Fusilier Regiment, a battalion of the 58th Infantry Regiment (from Krosno), a company of infantry from Smolno, 2 machine gun companies, a (light) field artillery regiment, a squadron of howitzers, a platoon of motorised artillery, a unit of mine throwers (mortars), squadrons of the 10th Uhlan Regiment (from Sulechów), two armoured trains, a company of sappers and some small Grenzschutz subunits. Commander: Colonel Lieutenant Burchardi. The forces were divided into five assault groups, two of which were to operate in the main directions, and the others in auxiliary directions. Group A composed of: the 1st Battalion of the 38th Fusilier Regiment, an infantry unit from Krosno, a Grenzschutz unit, a marching squadron of the 10th Uhlan Regiment, 2 field cannon batteries, a platoon of heavy howitzers and a motorised cannon, commanded by Captain Geisler, was ordered to attack Kargowa. It was subordinate to Group B, composed of a squadron of the 10th Uhlan Regiment and a machine gun unit, the task of which was to attack Wąchalewo – operating in an auxiliary direction. Group C, composed of: the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Fusilier Regiment, 30 uhlans from the 10th Regiment and 10 howitzers, commanded by Major Trievenberg, was to attack Babimost. Other groups (similarly to Group B) were to take auxiliary action. Group D: a Grenzschutz company and 20 uhlans of the 10th Regiment, were to attack and occupy the railway station building in Babimost with the help of an armoured train from Zbąszyń (commander: Lieutenant von Bose). Group E: 300 local volunteers and 2 batteries of cannons, was ordered to support the attack on Babimost. Despite the inaccuracy of any data that have survived until the present day, it may be inferred that the Germans planned an extensive operation taking advantage of the fact that they outnumbered the Poles, both in terms of people and equipment. It was mostly a regular army, not as willing to retreat as it was at the turn of December and January. The insurgent forces were much weaker; the region of Babimost and Kargowa was defended by the 4th Battalion of the Western Group, commanded by Second Lieutenant Stanisław Siuda. A company from Wolsztyn, commanded by Second Lieutenant Stanisław Tomiak, was stationed in Babimost. The defence of Kargowa was commanded by Second Lieutenant Kazimierz Szcześniak, who had insurgents from Wielichowo, Wilkowo and Kopanica at his disposal. The Polish side had been warned about the planned attack on Babimost by a Polish deserter from the 38th Fusilier Regiment. As the Germans planned to precede the attack with artillery fire, Second Lieutenant Siuda, who was aware of German plans, ordered his troops to move positions by a few hundred metres. As a result, the cannon fire was ineffective, and the proper attack was repulsed at great cost. The second attack failed as well. The Germans, therefore, changed their initial plan and set off towards Babimost from three directions: from Nowe Kramsko, from the south and from the north-east, towards the railway station. Both armoured trains were used as well. One of them managed to break through to the station. Despite the counter-attacks carried out by the soldiers from Chobienice, the insurgents had to abandon the station. At the same time, the Germans started bypassing the left flank, and the insurgents ran out of ammunition. As a result, they had to leave Babimost. The Polish soldiers went to Wielki Grójec, but the Germans managed to get ahead of them and occupied Chobienice. Second Lieutenant Siuda made the decision to form an assault group composed of soldiers withdrawing from Babimost and soldiers from the reserve. In a counter-attack, the Germans were pushed out of Chobienice. During the battle for Babimost, the Germans attacked Kargowa. They struck the area from the road from Kargowa to Babimost, through the road to Chwalim, the Obra Canal (formerly Zgniła Obra, Obrzyca), to the road from Kargowa to Karszyn. The insurgent positions were located on the outskirts of the town, in parallel to the German attack line. The area was divided into northern, central and southern sections. Each section was defended by a platoon of insurgents, with one platoon staying in reserve. On 11 February, the Polish posts situated north and west of Kargowa were pushed out. On the next day, the Germans started their full attack preceded by initial artillery fire. The insurgents managed to repulse the frontal assault twice with their close range shooting. Then, the Germans started flanking the soldiers defending Kargowa from the north-east, attacking with cannon fire and machine guns at the same time. Initially, the insurgents successfully repulsed the strikes, but the counter-strike to the enemy’s left flank failed. Despite consistent and well-organised defence, the Germans pushed the insurgents out to Kopanica and even managed to occupy a cemetery located in the southern part of the town. The defence of Kopanica was the next stage of the fight, because, apart from the cemetery, the Germans took the southern part of the town and intended to continue their attack towards the north-east. Kopanica was defended by insurgents retreating from Kargowa and a local unit commanded by Sergeant Józef Szwaba. The result of the fighting would, however, have been difficult to predict, if it had not been for a counter-attack of the reserve company commanded by Second Lieutenant Eckert. The Germans were pushed out of the northern canal of the Obra River. On 13 February, they made another attempt at occupying Kopanica, but it was a failure. The brave although unsuccessful defence of Babimost and Kargowa brought severe losses: 40 insurgents were killed, 70 were wounded and 30 were taken into captivity. Losses among the Germans were 70 dead and a great number of wounded.

Attempt at recovering the forebridge area near Wielki Grójec, 15 February 1919. On 12 February 1919, the Germans took the forebridge area near Wielki Grójec, which was a good location to start an attack on Wolsztyn from the vicinity of the Grójeckie Lake. Liquidation of the forebridge was therefore a necessary tactical move. Few details are known about the course of the fighting. The 2nd Poznań Battalion was to start the attack. The forebridge was attacked by two separate groups. Victory was within reach, when a German unit, marching from Wielki Grójec to replace German soldiers who were stationed there, appeared unexpectedly. The sudden attack and the doubling of enemy forces determined the victory of the Germans. One of the Polish groups was pushed back, the other one (North) was surrounded and destroyed; its commander, known for his participation in the battles that took place in December in Poznań, Second Lieutenant Edmund Krause, committed suicide. Second Lieutenant Maksymilian Moellenbrok also fell. In total, 32 insurgents were killed and 35 were wounded. 40 German soldiers were killed and 70 were wounded. Although Wielki Grójec was successfully defended, the insurgents failed to push the Germans out of the forebridge area.

The battles near Nowa Wieś Zbąska, 17 February 1919. In contrast to the situation near Wielki Grójec, the insurgents had their bridgehead near Nowa Wieś Zbąska. To liquidate it, the Germans attacked the town from three directions: from the north - from the road linking Nowa Wieś Zamek to Kosieczyn, from the west – from the edge of the forest between Zdzisław colony and the road linking Nowa Wieś Zbąska to Podmokla Wielkie and from the south – from the edge of the forest to the north of Grójec Wielki. Nowa Wieś Zbąska was defended by the 2nd Company of the 2nd Poznań Battalion, commanded by Second Lieutenant Korneliusz Mann. The Germans outnumbered the Polish forces seven to one. The enemy attacked simultaneously from the three directions. The insurgents initially managed to hold the attack off, soon, however, they were forced to retreat. Thanks to reinforcements, the Germans were pushed back out in a counter-attack. However, the losses were heavy: 20 insurgents were killed (including Second Lieutenant K. Mann) and many soldiers were wounded or taken into captivity.

The battles on the Northern Front between Łabiszyn and Kcynia:21 January – 17 February 1919. The German winter offensive was pursued with particular strength on the Northern Front, between Kcynia and Łabiszyn. Thus, this location once again became crucial to ensuring that the insurgents’ achievements were not lost. To break the Polish defence, the Germans involved nearly 3000 well-armed and well-equipped soldiers. By striking between Kcynia and Łabiszyn, they wanted to break through the defence line and get further into Greater Poland, towards Gniezno. The army’s morale was rather low. What is more, the Worker and Soldier Council from Bydgoszcz and a local Grenzschutz command delayed activities and obstructed the transport of food. The German plan of attack was based on the idea of dividing their forces into four assault groups and a reserve. The first group: the 4th Grenzschutz Battalion (commander: Captain Just). Task: to occupy Chmielniki, contact the right flank of German forces, attack Antoniewo and Nowa Wieś Wielka. The purpose of the action was to draw attention away from the direction of the main attack. The second group: the 1st Grenschutz Battalion (commander: Major Schemmel) and the 2nd Grenzschutz Battalion (commander: Major von Meisel). Task: to attack and occupy Kcynia. Third group: a unit of the 14th Infantry Regiment (from Bydgoszcz) – (commander: Rittmeister Scholl) and Lieutenant von Greiffenberg’s unit. Task: to occupy Szubin. The fourth group: the 4th Grenschutz Battalion, a voluntary unit of navy seamen (commander: Lieutenant Parsenov). Task: to occupy Rynarzewo. Reserve: the 2nd Grenschutz Battalion (commander: Captain Huber). The offensive was commanded by General von Belov. The Germans planned to break through the Polish defence line by occupying three towns which served as bases: Kcynia, Szubin and Rynarzewo. The manoeuvre was intentional, because von Belov had 3000 men at his disposal (in terms of numbers, it was merely an infantry regiment that was rather heterogeneous and in terms of value, quite considerably different from a regular formation) and they were not able to carry out offensive action on an extended front which was more than 25 kilometres wide. Occupation of the main towns in the region would allow for the establishing of bases for further attacks towards Gniezno, and guaranteed safety in the event of success. Polish intelligence managed to obtain information on the enemy’s plans. It made it possible for Second Lieutenant K. Grudzielski, Commander of the Northern Front, to prepare defences. The area threatened with attack was divided into seven sections: section 1, Inowrocław – commander: Second Lieutenant Paweł Cyms, section 2, Łabiszyn and section 3, Szubin, under joint command of Captain Jan Tomaszewski, section 4, Kcynia – commander: Second Lieutenant Konrad Golniewicz, section 5, Margonin – commander: Second Lieutenant Maksymilian Bartsch, section 6, Chodzież – commander: Lieutenant Włodzimierz Kowalski, section 7, Czarnków - commander: Second Lieutenant Michał Zenkteler. According to the Germans' plans, the attack was to focus on the first four sections. The German to Polish forces ratio was very unfavourable for the insurgents. The ratio was three German soldiers per one insurgent. There was also a large disproportion in firearms and artillery equipment. The situation improved on 21 January, when the Northern Front was reinforced with a company of heavy machine guns (commander: Second Lieutenant Józef Trawiński) and an artillery unit (commander: Second Lieutenant Edmund Zagrodzki). Furthermore, the insurgents had some time to perform engineering work to secure the defences and strengthen the protection of the crossings in Antoniewo and Dębionek. The commanders did not know the exact directions from which the German army would strike, the insurgents were, therefore, prepared for mobile defence, focusing on organising strong reserves. The Polish side finally decided to take the initiative and occupy a number of field points and towns which would make it difficult for the Germans to extend their attack. According to this plan, on 22 January, Captain Jan Tomaszewski and Second Lieutenant Paweł Cyms occupied Brzoza – however, they were forced to retreat soon afterwards as a result of a counter-attack carried out by a Grenschutz unit, which, according to the German plans, was the first strike group in the operation. Having occupied Brzoza, the same group marched towards Antoniewo. The attack carried out by Captain Just’s battalion, accompanied by artillery fire, was initially successful, and the company from Barcin, which was defending that section, abandoned its positions in panic. The Grenschutz unit preparing itself to attack Nowa Wieś was stopped by Feliks Dziennik’s machine gun fire and by cannon fire shot by Second Lieutenant Tadeusz Fabian’s company which had so far been in reserve. On 23 January, the Germans crossed the Noteć River in the vicinity of Ruda, but were pushed back. From that moment on, fighting in the entire front section from Kcynia to Łabiszyn turned into a series of local clashes fought by the insurgents with changing fortunes. Between 28 and 30 January the Germans finally managed to launch all four groups. Heavy battles were fought near Nowa Wieś. On 1 February, the Germans managed to cross the Noteć River once again, occupying Szubin, Rynarzewo and Łachowo. In this situation, the decision was made to counter-attack Rynarzewo with three companies: a company commanded by Second Lieutenant Tadeusz Fabian: along the Szubin - Rynarzewo road, a company commanded by Second Lieutenant Władysław Wlekliński and Master Corporal Wincenty Pluciński: towards Rudy–Florentynowo–Rynarzewo, and a company commanded by Second Lieutenant Józef Dratwiński: towards Dębionek. The battle for Rynarzewo took place on 2 and 3 February; the town changed hands several times. The final victory belonged to the Polish army. On 3 February, the insurgents successfully defended Kcynia. Not only did they manage to stop the German attack with artillery fire, but also flanked the enemy, forcing Major von Meisel's battalion to retreat with heavy losses; the Polish army captured 6 German cannons and other weapons. The event marked a visible weakening of the German army. Although more battles were fought near Rynarzewo, Zamość, Antoniewo, Brzoza, Rosek, Wrzeszczyna, Romanowo and Wilkowice, they did not change much in the overall structure of the front. On 3 and 4 February, the Germans unexpectedly (despite prior agreements) occupied Chodzież and Margonin. There was some fighting in the vicinity of Czarnków on 7 February, however, it did not bring any significant results. The German offensive on the Northern Front ended in defeat. On the Southern Front, which was the most peaceful one, the insurgent forces consisted of approximately 1000 soldiers, and the largest unit was the Ostrzeszów Battalion commanded by Second Lieutenant Stanisław Thiel. It was a region where relatively few battles were fought, but where both sides carried out numerous intelligence-related operations. Between 15 and 16 January, Polish forces won battles near Ligota and Kobyla Góra. Three days later, a larger battle was fought at Rogaszyce. Around 9 February, Mikorzyn, Jutrków, Mechnice and Lubczyna were taken, and on 13 February, military action directed at Kępno was initiated. On 19 February, the insurgents were defeated near the town of Korzeń. Finally, they managed to reach the line along Kotowskie, Szklarka Przygodzicka, Jezioro, Dąbrowa, Myślniew, Kobyla Góra, Zmyślona Parzynowska, Korzeń, Klin, and Kierzno up to Mirkowa on the Prosna River. The insurgents planned an attack on Kępno during the night of 17 to 18 February 1919, but cancelled it on learning that the German side had discovered their plans.