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The outbreak of the Uprising in Greater Poland did not lead to similar events in Pomerania and Upper Silesia. These regions were not yet ready to act. Also, Greater Poland did not have sufficient forces at its disposal to select any for the purpose of carrying out insurgent expeditions in the northerly or southerly directions; as a consequence of this, the conspirators in Pomerania and Silesia were directly instructed not to initiate any armed operations, which would immediately be doomed to failure from the very start. However, at the beginning of January 1919, action aimed at homogenisation of the structures of the military underground in Silesia was initiated. Also envoys, Zygmunt Wiza and Kazimierz Jesionek, were sent there with money intended for independence-related work. These were also the people who contributed to the establishment of the Polish Military Organisation of the Upper Silesia (PMOUS) on 5 January 1919; the leader of the organisation was Józef Grzegorzek, an official of the People’s Bank in Bytom. In February 1919, Central Command in Poznań decided to strengthen the links between the structures of the PMOUS and the Poznań headquarters, and to make the conspirators from Silesia take the same oath that was obligatory for the Greater Poland Armies. With time, however, control of the situation in Silesia was lost and on top of this, the lack of any guarantee for implementing the army commanded by J. Haller, which had returned to the country, was also a reason for refraining from any insurgent actions.

Ultimately, however, fighting, which ended in failure, broke out in August 1919. The inhabitants of Greater Poland tried to support their countrymen in Silesia with a large amount of involvement - not only during the armed struggle, but also in the years 1918–1921. Committees which demonstrated solidarity with this region were established, and money, as well as food and clothing wagons, were sent to Silesia. In spring 1919, the possibility of the commencement of insurgent operations in Silesia was taken into serious consideration in Greater Poland. A volunteer battalion consisting of exiles from Silesia started to be formed in Częstochowa in the February of that year. At the end of April the unit was subordinated to Central Command in Poznań and renamed as the Bytom Rifle Regiment; the Poznań National Defence Battalion became the second battalion of this regiment. Then, the composition of the unit which fulfilled the role of a reserve unit for the Western Group of the Greater Poland Front became more and more mixed. In February 1920, the Bytom Rifle Regiment was transferred to Ostrów Wielkopolski, in March it was reinforced by a battalion from Września, and then it participated in the repossession of those territories granted to Poland, in the vicinity of Odolanów. From 1922, this regiment was to be renamed the 75th Infantry Regiment.

In 1920, both parties to the conflict were preparing for an armed confrontation using any possible means available to them. Covert platoons and companies undertook their activities under the facade of sport clubs or security services. In Upper Silesia, the same problem which conspirators from Greater Poland had to face in autumn 1918 appeared, that is, there was a shortage of higher-ranked commanders. Silesia, as part of the Prussian Partition was subject to the same rigours and limitations as Greater Poland, and the Polish troops formed there after the year 1919 suffered a great shortage of higher-ranked officers. In Greater Poland this problem was resolved by the inflow of officers from the former 1st Polish Corps, as well as accelerated courses for officers and the promotion of the most talented non-commissioned officers. As a result of this, after the formation of the regular Greater Poland Army, it was possible to fill all the posts. After the war with the Bolsheviks, these officers, which remained contracted for the wartime period were no longer needed in such great numbers, and some of them could be sent to Silesia.

In the year 1920, granting active military aid to Silesia was, in reality, impossible. But after the fighting came to an end, organisational work was started immediately. Both from Warsaw and Poznań, camouflaged transports of weapons, ammunition and military uniforms started to be sent (without state insignia). Also, the granting of leave to officers and non-commissioned officers was practiced; they arrived in Silesia under assumed names (after the fighting broke out, they used pseudonyms one way or another). They joined the local security services and paramilitary associations with much lower military ranks. At the moment of the outbreak of the uprising they revealed their true rank and took the posts indicated within the structure of the insurgent army. It was particularly important to make sure that the arriving officers had experience of serving in the German army - that is the army in which their subordinates –the Silesians had served before the year 1918. Just as was the case with the Greater Poland Army, former soldiers of the Prussian army, who knew perfectly well, the regulations, drills, tactics and even German commands (despite the fact that the unit was composed of Poles) served in insurgent units in Upper Silesia - thus the commanders from Greater Poland and their subordinates from Silesia often understood each other without words. There was no need for additional training or explanations. It is no coincidence that in the year 1920, General Kazimierz Raszewski (a former German officer), then the commander of the Poznań General District, based on the order of the minister of military affairs, was appointed as the military leader for the defence of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. Particular attention must be paid to the selection of the politicians and officers occupying the highest posts in the army of the 3rd Upper Silesia Uprising in May 1921. The director of the uprising was Wojciech Korfanty - a native Silesian, but at the same time, one of the commissars of the Supreme People's Council from the period of the Greater Poland Uprising, who held his office from Poznań. From January 1921, two months before the plebiscite, Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Mielżyński (psuedonym: Novina Doliwa) arrived in Silesia. He had not participated in the Greater Poland Uprising but he was a land-owner from Greater Poland. He took command of the Plebiscite Defence Command - the future Supreme Command of the Insurgent Armies. He was the first supreme commander of the armies of the 3rd Upper Silesia uprising. After his dismissal on 31 May 1921, the post of chief commander was taken by a Greater Poland inhabitant, Lieutenant Colonel Kazimierz Zenkteler (pseudonym: Warwas), the commander in Grodzisk during the Greater Poland Uprising. The leader of the group “North” was Captain Alojzy Nowak (pseudonym: Neugebauer), previously the commander of the insurgents from Września and Jarocin. The “South” group leader – Lieutenant Colonel Bronisław Sikorski (pseudonym: Cietrzew), was a Greater Poland insurgent and infantry instructor of the Poznań General District Command. Some commanders of the 3rd Silesian Uprising were also Greater Poland inhabitants, including Captain Krzysztof Konwerski – the commander of a subgroup in the ”North” group, Major Leonard Krukowski – a battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Franciszek Rataj – commander of the Pszczyn regiment, Heliodor Cepa – a communications specialist, and Lieutenant Mieczysław Szreybrowski – head of the operational division of the “North” group. While comparing the involvement of the Greater Poland inhabitants and officers from central Poland who were then sent to Upper Silesia, and above all, the manning of the leading commanding posts by them, it can be concluded that the third Upper Silesia Uprising was a result of the effort of people representing all three partitions. About 6000 volunteers from Greater Poland participated in two of the Silesian Uprisings: several hundred in the first uprising and the rest in the third one. However, the point of this involvement was not the number of people, but the role which they played in the management and command of the uprising. It is estimated that around 40% of the volunteers from outside the Upper Silesia region who stood up to fight in May 1921, came from Greater Poland.