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• The sharp deterioration in the situation on the Northern Front (...)
• Both groups left for their respective areas (...)
• The battle for Łabiszyn was an interesting example (...)
• Taking into account the strong resistance of the Germans (...)
• The second group did not take part in the direct attack. (...)

Both groups left for their respective areas of concentration on 11 January 1919: the Eastern Group from Gąsawa and the Western Group from Damasławek. The Eastern Group had a shorter distance to cover, but meanwhile, the task assigned to it was changed. Now it was not supposed to attack but only to block Żnin. Ultimately, M. Cieślicki took the decision to attack. To this end, he divided his group into four parts, deploying them as follows: west of the Żnin-Rydlewo crossroads, at the railway track east of Rydlewo, to the north west of the school in Podgórzyn, and in the south-western edge of the town of Góra. The group attacked Żnin, forcing the Germans to involve their reserve units. Despite the fierce fighting and the infliction of serious losses on the enemy which resulted in a temporary seizure of the sugar plant, the insurgents did not manage to enter the town.

The western group in Sarbinowo split into three parts: the first one attacked along the road connecting Sarbinowo and Żnin, the second one along the Żnin–Wieś–Żnin section and the third one was sent to the north to safeguard the railway line to Bydgoszcz, east of Jaroszewo. The attack of this group started later than the attack of the group commanded by M. Cieślicki, and also was not synchronised with the plans of the insurgent who attacked from the south and east, it ended in failure. During the night of 11 to 12 January, the Germans, being cut off from the surrounding areas and having no hope for reinforcements, left the town and retreated to Bydgoszcz. On 12 January, Żnin was taken by the insurgents. Losses: 42 dead and about 100 wounded insurgents.

The fighting for Żnin clearly demonstrated all the features of the battles fought so far by the insurgents. There was no synchronisation of the activities of both groups and there was no joint commander of the entire action. The proper concept of the battle-plan was not implemented despite the sacrifices and involvement of ordinary soldiers. The final objective, i.e. the liberation of Żnin was accomplished, however, not as a result of direct fighting, but rather the effective encirclement of the city and the determination of the insurgents. Furthermore, the decisions of the command were not always consistent. The supposition must be made that a last-minute change in the concept of the entire operation took place, and the main burden of the fighting was shifted to the battle for Szubin. In the face of the seizure of Szubin and for fear of being surrounded, the fact of the possible departure of the Germans from Żnin was taken into account.

In order to take control of Łabiszyn (this direction was treated as secondary by the command) the insurgent forces started to concentrate in Barcin. The following units were gathered there:

– from Kruszwica (commander: Second Lieutenant Kazimierz Dratwiński),

– from Pakość (commander: Sergeant Kazimierz Szmańda),

– from Barcin (commander: Corporeal Leon Krukowski).

In total: 172 poorly armed people.

The commander of this action was Władysław Poczekaj.

The German crew in Łabiszyn consisted of one hundred soldiers, there are no specific details regarding these soldiers.

The Polish units were concentrated east of the town of Kania which itself is situated south of Łabiszyn. From there, on 11 January, the units marched out along the road connecting the towns of Kania and Łabiszyn. More or less in the area of Łabiszyn Wieś, the column was divided into smaller subunits, which encircled the town. After the closure of the ring from the north, the subunits which were present there, started their attack on the town. The sounds of shooting were at the same time a signal for the remaining units. The concentric, fast and determined attack from all directions at the same time, supported by information obtained from the local Polish residents led to the capitulation of the Germans and the seizure of Łabiszyn.