Fighting on Insurgent Fronts

THE FIGHTING IN THE VICINITY OF ZDZIECHOWA 29 - 31 December 1918

Marek Rezler

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On 31 December, in the morning, another march towards Zdziechowa began. The units from Września developed a line formation south of the village, the 1st company on the right flank and the 2nd company on the left flank; the flanks and gaps between the subunits were covered by machine guns. Later on, one platoon of the 2nd company, with a machine gun, took up positions north west of Wendorff's estate in Zdziechowa. The surrounded Germans opened fire, killing one insurgent. Finally, an agreement was reached according to which the Germans were allowed to withdraw to Zbąszyń. The Polish acquisitions were considerable: 500 hand guns, 12 heavy and several light machine guns. Ultimately, however, the Germans managed to get out to Bydgoszcz through Żnin, together with their newly-abducted Polish negotiators and the cannons which had been captured by the Poles the previous day. Then, the Polish envoys were exchanged for German officers who had been taken into captivity in Zdziechowa.

The evaluation of the skirmish near Zdziechowa must be rigorous. It was organised without due consideration and chaotically, even without the moral support of the political authorities of the region. The lack of consistency in the action taken was noticeable, the political and military actions were not synchronised and the lack of experience in command (especially on 30 December) manifested itself on many occasions. This phenomenon was clearly visible in the lack of consistency in all the action taken against the Germans during both days, and in the positive though shameful (in terms of organisation) end of the whole affair. A supposition must be made that the final success was owed, to a great extent, to the determination of the rank-and-file insurgents and the surprisingly low operability of the Germans, who limited themselves to imposing harsh demands on the insurgents. It is rather hard to claim that this was a battle or bigger military clash. This was just a skirmish, based more on fighting nerve than military success. However, it must be concluded that, in the end, the events in Zdziechowa protected Gniezno from German intervention and significantly increased the morale of insurgents and were a true incentive for the continuation of the fight.

The differences in the level of training and command were clearly visible when units from different towns are compared. As early as two days after the outbreak of the uprising, it was possible to carry out activities using the forces of a well organised and commanded infantry battalion. These subunits, formed on the basis of the Guard and Security Service, were, above all, of a regional nature - thus the preserved descriptions and other accounts mention the Poznań insurgents, the Września insurgents, the Środa insurgents, etc. These units would usually be tight and disciplined as opposed to the platoons and companies formed spontaneously in a given area (though in terms of their numbers, they were usually much smaller than the normal size of a platoon, company, etc.). Certain facts, rather uncommon for a regular army, also occurred, e.g. going back home after the fighting was over on a completely arbitrary basis. In addition to this, sometimes even the heavy military equipment, which had been captured with so much effort several hours ago, was abandoned. At this stage of the development of events, the Germans demonstrated greater initiative and recovered their losses often without too much trouble. However, as fighting was continued, they demonstrated, in general, less psychical resistance, irrespective of the so far presented confident or even arrogant behaviour. On the other hand, they quickly took counter-measures during moments of confusion and disorganisation among insurgents.

Unfortunately not many good things can be said about the qualifications of some of the Polish commanders.  Undoubtedly, there were many factors here which resulted from the lack of professional qualifications among frequently self-appointed commanders. The common enthusiasm and willingness to fight did not always go hand in hand with solid and proven skills and a sense of discipline. The fighting for Poznań, the liberation of Gniezno and then the skirmish near Zdziechowa all presented the characteristics typical for a spontaneous uprising.

 

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