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• The battles for Chodzież and Szubin were directly connected (...)
• The Czarnków unit commenced the battle (...)

The battles for Chodzież and Szubin were directly connected to the confusion among the Germans which was caused by the occupation of Nakło by insurgents. That town, as has already been mentioned, was the main communication node in this region for the German units retreating to the west. On top of this, Nakło was a convenient base for raids on Ślesin and Bydgoszcz, Wysoka, Piła and Łobżenica. This offered real chances for the further development of the uprising in the direction of Pomerania. 

Diplomatic negotiations aimed at persuading the Poles to leave Nakło were combined with concrete military activities undertaken by the Germans. From the east, they could boast certain accomplishments: Szubin had been recovered and maintained, and Łabiszyn and Żnin were occupied. This presented a real opportunity to cut off the Polish wedge directed towards Nakło. Thus a lot depended on the outcome of the fighting along the Western frontline section - in the vicinity of Chodzież and Margonin. As early as on 7 January 1919, the Germans tried to conduct a direct attack on Nakło; although they were able to defeat the insurgents near Wysoka and Mrocza, the Polish defence in Ślesin was not broken. 

Chodzież was occupied by insurgents (by virtue of an agreement) on 6 January 1919. A garrison, which consisted of 250 soldiers and was commanded by Second Lieutenant Włodzimierz Kowalski, entered the city. It comprised the Wągrowiec unit (about 40 people) and a People’s Guard unit organised temporarily on the spot (about 200 soldiers).

The Germans, despite the agreement, organised an expedition from Piła to recapture Chodzież. The insurgents could not stand the pressure and withdrew from Chodzież to Budzyń. From then on, the town became a region of concentration of Polish forces which were to be used in action aimed at the recovery of Chodzież. On 7 January, the following insurgent units were gathered there:

– Wągrowiec unit (commander: Antoni Biskupski)                about 100 people

– from Rogoźno (commander: Seweryn Skrzetuski)              about 140 people

– from Czarnków (commander: Zygmunt Łakiński)               about 100 people

– from Margonin (commander: Franciszek Kryza), and also

– reinforcements from Wągrowiec and a volunteer unit from Budzyń   about 50 soldiers.

Armaments (excluding personal weapons): 8 heavy machine guns and one light machine gun.

Presumably on 8 January in the morning, in Budzyń, there were already 800 insurgents. They were led by Second Lieutenant Włodzimierz Kowalski. In Chodzież, three infantry companies and a unit of German dragoons were deployed - in total about 800 soldiers and a few dozen settlers. Furthermore, the Germans manned the Rataje property, the railway station in Chodzież and a forest lodge near the village of Podanin.

The author of the plan and the final commander of the action in Chodzież is unknown. It may be supposed that Second Lieutenant Włodzimierz Kowalski, the commander of the Wagrowiec unit, and Zdzisław Ostrowski, the commandant of Military District IV since 7 January 1919, tried to implement their individual intentions in parallel. 

Chodzież was to be attacked from three directions:

– the Wągrowiec unit (commander: Second Lieutenant W. Kowalski) – south of Podanin and on towards Chodzież,

– the Oborniki unit (commander: S. Skrzetuski) – operating from the east towards the Rataje property and on towards Chodzież,

– the Rogoźno and Czarnków units (commanders: A. Biskupski and Z. Łakiński) – attack on Chodzież from the west, in the direction of the railway station.

The idea was that these attacks were supposed to be started at the same time on 8 January 1919, at 8.00 a.m. However, in reality, there was no synchronisation and the respective insurgent units often fought on their own with varying results, especially if it is taken into account that there were no arrangements regarding communication between the respective groups.