Select Pages

• Soon after the outbreak of insurgent fighting in Poznań (...)
• Only two of the three groups managed (...)

Only two of the three groups managed to take up the agreed positions at the expected time, the one from the Kcynia – Gniezno regions (which intended to attack along the road running from Nakło and Kcynia) and the one from the Żnin region, positioned along the road running from Żnin. In total this was about 500 people. The Września unit commanded by Wiewiórowski arrived later because of black ice on the road.

Despite the unfavourable situation and the absence of the insurgents who were to strike from the east, the decision to launch the attack was taken, however, it broke down under the heavy fire of the German defence. The Kcynia unit, commanded by Józef Codrow, which entered the town from Nakielska Street, was pushed back by a counter-attack, resulting in high losses among the insurgents. As a result of this, the attack of the north-western group and southern group was repelled. The eastern group commanded by W. Wiewiórowski, attacked alone, even after his neighbours had already been defeated. This attack also failed. The railway station was not seized and the insurgents had to retreat with heavy losses. The group commander, among others was injured and having been taken into captivity he died of his wounds on 13 January in a hospital in Bydgoszcz.

The attempt at the seizure of Szubin ended in a severe defeat for the insurgents: 23 insurgents were killed, 20 were wounded and 92 were taken into captivity. On 8 January, the Germans occupied Łabiszyn and Żnin, thus safeguarding the approach to Bydgoszcz.

The most important cause of the defeat was the lack of uniform command and coordination between the respective groups. The attack was conducted in waves, not as a line formation, flanks were uncovered and there was no communication ensured between the groups, therefore elementary mistakes were committed and the Germans immediately took advantage of them, defending Szubin skilfully. With regards to the Germans, it was noticeable that the coordination between the infantry and the artillery was very good and the machine gun fire and cannon fire were directed appropriately. The sacrifices made by the insurgents and their will to fight could not compensate for the ineptitude of the commanding staff which is held fully responsible for the defeat in the first battle of Szubin. As a result of fighting on 8 January, not only was the city not seized by insurgents, but also the initiative was handed over to the enemies which increased the area under their occupation.