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• In the second half of January and the first half of February 1919 (...)
• The German to Polish forces ratio was very unfavourable (...)

In the second half of January and the first half of February 1919, battles were fought with particular intensity on the Northern Front between Kcynia and Łabiszyn. Thus, this location once again became crucial to ensure that the insurgents’ achievements were not lost. To break the Polish defence, the Germans involved nearly 3000 well-armed and equipped soldiers. By striking between Kcynia and Łabiszyn, they wanted to break through the defence line and get further into Greater Poland towards Gniezno, however, the army’s morale was rather low. What is more, the Worker and Soldier Council from Bydgoszcz and a local Grenzschutz command delayed actions and obstructed the transport of food. The German plan of attack was as follows.

All the forces were divided into four assault groups and a reserve.

1. The first group: the 4th Grenzschutz Battalion (commander: Captain Just).

Task: to occupy Chmielniki, contact the right flank of German forces and attack Antoniewo and Nowa Wieś Wielka. The purpose of this manoeuvre was to draw attention away from the direction of the main attack.

2. The second group: the 1st Grenzschutz Battalion (commander: Major Schemmel).

the 2nd Grenzschutz Battalion (commander: Major Meisel).

Task: to attack and occupy Kcynia.    

3. The third group:

– unit (?) of the 14th Infantry Regiment (from Bydgoszcz) – commander: Rittmeister Scholl,

– Lieutenant von Greiffenberg’s unit.

Task: to occupy Szubin.

4. The fourth group:

– the 4th Grenzschutz Battalion,

– a voluntary naval unit (commander: Lieutenant Parsenow).

Task: to occupy Rynarzewo.

5. Reserve: the 2nd Grenzschutz Battalion (commander: Captain Huber).

The offensive was commanded by General von Belov.

The Germans planned to break through the Polish defence line by occupying three towns which served as bases: Kcynia, Szubin and Rynarzewo. The manoeuvre was intentional, because the 3000 men von Belov actually had at his disposal (in terms of numbers, it was merely an infantry regiment that was rather heterogeneous and in terms of value, it differed quite considerably from a regular formation) were not able to carry out offensive actions on an extended front which was more than 25 kilometres long. Occupying the main towns in the region would allow for the establishment of their own bases for a further attack towards Gniezno, and guaranteed safety in the event of success.

Polish intelligence managed to obtain information about the enemy’s plans. This made it possible for Lieutenant Colonel K. Grudzielski, commander of the Northern Front, to prepare the defence. The area that was to be attacked was divided into seven sections:

– section 1, Inowrocław –  commander: Second Lieutenant Paweł Cyms,

– section 2, Łabiszyn- commander: Captain Jan Tomaszewski

– section 3, Szubin, commander: also Captain Jan Tomaszewski

– section 4, Kcynia – commander: Second Lieutenant Konrad Golniewicz,

– section 5, Margonin – commander: Second Lieutenant Maksymilian Bartsch,

– section 6,  Chodzież – commander: Lieutenant Włodzimierz Kowalski

– section 7, Czarnków - commander: Second Lieutenant Michał Zenkteler.

According to the German plans, the attack was to focus on the first four sections.