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• In the second half of January and the first half of February 1919 (...)
• The German to Polish forces ratio was very unfavourable (...)

The German to Polish forces ratio was very unfavourable to the insurgents, it  was three German soldiers per one insurgent. There was also a large disproportion in firearms and artillery equipment. The situation improved on 21 January, when the Northern Front was reinforced with a company of heavy machine guns (commander: Second Lieutenant Józef Trawiński) and an artillery unit  (?) (commander: Second Lieutenant Edmund Zagrodzki).Furthermore, the insurgents had some time to perform engineering work to secure the defence and strengthen the protection of the crossings in Antoniewo and Dębionek. The commanders did not know the exact directions in which the German army would strike, the insurgents were therefore prepared for mobile defence, focusing on organising strong reserves.

The Polish side finally decided to take the initiative and occupied a number of field points and towns, which would make it difficult for the Germans to extend the attack. According to this plan, on 22 January, Captain Jan Tomaszewski and Second Lieutenant P. Cyms occupied Brzoza – however, they were forced to retreat soon afterwards as a result of a counterattack carried out by a Grenschutz unit, which, according to the German plans, was the first strike group in the operation. Having occupied Brzoza, the same group marched towards Antoniewo. The attack carried out by Captain Just’s battalion, accompanied by artillery fire, was initially successful, and the company from Barcin, which defended the section, abandoned its positions in panic. The Grenschutz unit, preparing itself to attack Nowa Wieś, was stopped by Feliks Dziennik’s machine-gun fire and by cannon fire shot by Second-Lieutenant Tadeusz Fabian’s company which had so far been in reserve.

On 23 January, the Germans crossed the Noteć River in the vicinity of Ruda, but were pushed back. From that moment on, the fighting on the entire front section from Kcynia to Łabiszyn turned into a series of local clashes fought by the insurgents, with changing fortunes. Between 28 and 30 January the Germans finally managed to launch all four groups and heavy fighting took place near Nowa Wieś.

On 1 February, the Germans managed to cross the Noteć River once again and occupy Szubin, Rynarzewo and Łachowo. In this situation, the decision was made to counter-attack Rynarzewo with three companies:

– a company commanded by Second Lieutenant Tadeusz Fabian: along the Szubin - Rynarzewo road,

– a company commanded by Second Lieutenant Władysław Wlekliński and Master Corporal Wincenty Pluciński: along the Rudy–Florentynowo–Rynarzewo line,

– a company commanded by Second Lieutenant Józef Dratwiński: heading towards Dębionek.

Battles for Rynarzewo took place on 2 and 3 February; several times the town changed hands but the final victory belonged to the Polish army.

On 3 February, the insurgents successfully defended Kcynia. Not only did they manage to stop the German attack with artillery fire, but they also flanked the enemy, forcing Major von Meisel's battalion to retreat with heavy losses; the Polish army captured 6 German cannons and other weapons.

It can be concluded that that these events marked a visible weakening of the German army. Although more battles were fought near Zamość, Antoniewo, Brzoza, Rosek, Wrzeszczyna, Romanowo and Wilkowice, they did not change much in the overall front structure. On 3 and 4 February, the Germans unexpectedly (despite prior agreements) occupied Chodzież and Margonin. There was some fighting in the vicinity of Czarnków on 7 February, however, this did not bring any significant results.

Still on 18 February, intensive fighting was going on near Rynarzewo, where a German armoured train was captured after fierce fighting and at the cost of heavy losses.

The German offensive on the Northern Front ended in defeat. The fact that the insurgent units had become well established was once again confirmed,  and the spontaneous enthusiasm (sometimes) turned into conscious heroism. The experience and front-line training of the soldiers started to become more obvious, which in combination with the awareness of a righteous fight gave a real and moral advantage over the enemy to the Poles. As a result, the most important front of the Greater Poland uprising was defended and only a few insignificant changes took place there until the signing of the armistice in Trier.