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• As opposed to the battles fought on the Northern Front (...)
• Only the Jarocin Company attempted to attack the city (...)

Only the Jarocin Company attempted to attack the city, but without support from its neighbouring units, this action ended in failure; the respective units did not even reach their starting points for the attack. The only positive event was the firing of accurate shots at the railway station and the starch factory. As a result of this, the insurgent units were concentrated in Łomnica, where a German attack was repulsed on 17 January - preventing the enemy from completely taking over the initiative in the region after the failed attempt by the Poles at taking Zbąszyń.

The battles of Zbąszyń ended in defeat, which was the result of the ineptitude of the Polish command and the shortage of professional qualifications of the mid-rank staff. The organisation of cooperation or rather its lack must be evaluated with exceptional criticism. As a consequence of this, the ingenious operation, which was planned on such a large scale, was wasted and the German garrison in Zbąszyń was a real threat for the liberated part of Greater Poland until the end of the uprising.

As has been mentioned, the German garrison stationed in Kopanica (the reinforced infantry battalion), was to be eliminated by means of insurgent forces from Wolsztyn. These were:

– the Wolsztyn Company (about 120 people, commander: Second Lieutenant Stanisław Tomiak),

– the Wielichowo Company (about 100 people, commander: Second Lieutenant Kazimierz Szcześniak),

– the Stęszew Company (about 120 people, commander: Second Lieutenant Paweł Szyfter),

– a unit from Rakoniewice (40 people, commander Żak - his first name is unknown).

As time passed, insurgents from Chobienice, Obra and Kębłowo joined this group.

The commander of these forces was Second Lieutenant Stanisław Siuda.

On 10 January, the entire Polish grouping set off for Wolsztyn, with the initial intention of participating in the attack on Zbąszyń. Ultimately however, upon receiving news of the seizure of Siedlec by the Germans, the route of the further march was changed and preparations were started to attack Kopanica. The town was taken in the morning on 11 January, in a concentric attack from the north (Stęszew and Wielichowo companies), from the east (Wolsztyn company) and from the south (the insurgents from Rakoniewice, Obra and Kębłowo).The excellent synchronisation of the respective activities and the simultaneous attack of all these units contributed to the success. Unfortunately, this was not enough to block the town from the west and the Kopanica garrison withdrew to the region of Kargowa. In contrast to the fighting for Zbąszyń where there were about one hundred fallen and wounded insurgents altogether, the losses near Kopanica were almost insignificant: Just 1 killed and a few wounded insurgents. Also quite a lot of the German armaments and equipment was captured.

The seizure of Kopanica confirmed the possibility of accomplishing success under the conditions of good cooperation and synchronisation of activities - as was the case with the battles for Łabiszyn. In the day order of Central Command of 13 January 1919, this success gained the highest recognition of the military leaders of the uprising. At the same time, Command set the ultimate borderline for insurgent operations in the western direction along the Zbąszyń lakes and Obra River.

However, it must also be concluded that during the fighting for Zbąszyń and Kopanica, the Polish command acted chaotically, in a manner which proved their inability to cooperate and synchronise the respective stages. The reconnaissance of the enemy was poor as opposed to the Germans who were kept informed on the plans and activities of the Poles on a current basis. During the entire operation, K. Zenkteler did not control the situation. The deficiencies in command were, just like before, compensated by the heroism of rank-and-file soldiers and the determination of lower-rank commanders.