THE BATTLES FOR RAWICZ 3-4 February and 5-6 February 1919
Marek Rezler
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In accordance with the plan drawn up by the front’s Head of Staff Zygmunt Wieliczka, the insurgents intended to take Łaszczyn and Dębno Polskie, cut the telegraph and railway connections and protect the town from a possible attack by German reinforcements that might be sent from Sarnowa, Bojanowo and Gierłachowo. The final plan of attack on Rawicz was, however, drawn up by Second Lieutenant Alfons Breza, who by that time was the Commander of the Rawicz section. Three strike groups were formed:
1. Group 1 (approx. 260 people):
– the Zakrzewo Company (commander – Wojciech Kozal, approx. 80 people)
– the 1st Jarocin Company (commander - Felix Nadolski, approx. 114 people)
– the Jutrosin unit (approx. 40 people),
– the Dubin unit (approx. 20 insurgents),
Task: to attack Rawicz from the north, from the Zakrzewo - Kawcze region.
2. Group 2 (approx. 330 people):
– the Górka Battalion (commander – Konstanty Pietruszyński).
Task: to attack in the Żołędnica - Niemarzyn belt, towards Sarnowa.
3. Group 3 (approx. 500 people):
– insurgent units from towns and villages such as Chojno, Golejewo, Słupia Kapitulna, Zielona Wieś and Koźmin.
Task: to attack Dębno Polskie, Kąty and Szymanowo from Słupia Kapitulna and Zielona Wieś.
The attack started in the night of 3 to 4 February. Despite their initial successes, the occupation of Łaszczyn, Szymanowo and the reaching of Rawicz suburbs, the insurgent units had to withdraw back to their starting positions. The first battle of Rawicz was a defeat. Z. Wieliczka claims that the person responsible for it was Alfons Breza, however, it seems that the matter is not that simple. Analysis of drafts, maps and the organisational structure of the insurgent units allows for the drawing of a number of conclusions:
1. there was no uniform command;
2. the insurgent line was too stretched (about 15 km along a straight line) and the distance between the deployment line and the objective of the attack was too long - about 5 km.– which, to a certain extent was the result of small outposts and guards placed in the foreground by the Germans;
3. there was an almost complete lack of coordination between the Polish units, some attacks were carried out by the respective commanders on their own, and they had scarce information regarding the forces the enemy had at their disposal;
4. it is possible to have many reservations regarding the level of discipline among the insurgents;
5. the Polish units were not sufficiently supplied with ammunition.
In general, from a strictly military point of view, there is no way anyone could find any excuses for the Polish command which failed during the first battle of Rawicz, both at the stage of planning of the battle and during its course.
After the events of 3 and 4 February 1919, both parties prepared themselves for another attack. The Germans were reinforced by units from Żmigrów, Leszno and Bojanowo, and, temporarily, from Oborniki Śląskie. 500 new insurgents came to the Rawicz section:
– the 3rd Jarocin Company (commander – Stanisław Krystofiak),
– the 4th Jarocin Company (commander - Alojzy Nowak),
Both Jarocin companies were commanded by Bronisław Kirchner.
– the 2nd Pleszew Company (commander - Antoni Kozłowicz),
– the 2nd Koźmin Company (commander - Franciszek Ciesielski).