Fighting on Insurgent Fronts

THE BATTLES FOR RAWICZ 3-4 February and 5-6 February 1919

Marek Rezler

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The front commanders, having learnt their lesson after the first battle of Rawicz, took the decision to occupy Rawicz during the night of 5 to 6 February. Thus, the attack was to cover a 6 kilometre wide front, and was to be implemented in two stages:

– the seizure of Konarzewo, Łaszczyn and Sarnowo,

– an attack on Rawicz from the positions gained in this way.

A. Breza, however, made the unauthorised decision to occupy Dąbrówka as well, which extended the attack line to north-east. His decision was one of the fundamental mistakes in the battle of 3-4 February.

The Forces attacked frontally from several directions simultaneously. The attack of the 2nd Company from Koźmin on Dąbrówka was unsuccessful, despite the fact that the soldiers managed to reach the edge of the village. The second, central group occupied Sarnówka and, after fierce fighting, also Sarnowa. However, the insurgents failed to keep the towns, because the commanders did not duly protect them; furthermore, the Pleszew company was mistakenly fired at by soldiers from the 1st Górka company.

In the meanwhile, the Germans took advantage of the fact that the insurgents had left the railway tracks undamaged and made use of their armoured train. At the same time, on 7 February, soldiers from the Hannover Riflemen Battalion and the 50th Infantry Regiment counter-attacked, with the support of the train. The Germans took Sarnowa and forced the insurgents to withdraw from Sarnówka. It was only the 3rd Jarocin Company near Miejska Górka that managed to stop them.

As a result, both battles of Rawicz did not change anything in the position of either side. The extreme incompetence of the section commanders and the repetitive mistakes committed despite their prior experience resulted in bitterness and discouragement among the insurgents. The Górka Battalion and the Pleszew Company left. They were replaced by a battalion from Śrem (commander - Stefan Chosłowski) composed of approx. 550 well-organised, armed and disciplined soldiers.

In the meantime, the Germans, encouraged by their victories, planned to attack the left flank of the Polish section on 10 February. To this end, they gathered the Hannover Riflemen Battalion, which was given the task to attack the town of Stwolno. One battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment from Dębno Polskie was ordered to attack Zielona Wieś, while two companies of the 6th Grenadier Regiment from the region of Nowa Wieś were to occupy Wydawy, attacking it from the south. The last two groups were to receive cannon support from Dębno Polskie, Dębno (former Dębno Niemieckie) and Nowa Wieś.

From a captured soldier, the Polish side learned about the German plans, the insurgents were therefore ready to repulse the attack. On 10 February, German artillery fire caused great losses among the town’s defendants. When the proper attack started, they managed to occupy Wydawy, Zielona Wieś and Stwolno. Near Zawady and Słupia Kapitulna, insurgents commanded by Marian Szulc and Michał Lorkiewicz successfully resisted the enemy. The Germans left Stwolno and Wydawy, and were pushed out of Zielona Wieś. For a bloody price (nearly 300 soldiers killed in both battles of Rawicz), the insurgents managed to hold their positions.

The conclusions from the second battle of Rawicz are similar as in the case of the evaluation of the combat which took place on 3–4 February. The same mistakes were repeated, there was no control of the development of the events, the burden of the battles and their results rested almost completely on the shoulders of rank-and-file insurgents. What is more, it is even difficult to justify tactically the attempt at capturing Rawicz. Equally strong German garrisons, which threatened the uprising, were also stationed in the surrounding towns, but there were no attempts made at attacking them. Evaluation of the command of the front and the Rawicz section must be harsh, as it first launched an action, but then lost control of it. The situation was only saved by strong, disciplined reinforcements sent by Central Command. Alfons Breza was dismissed and his post was taken by Colonel Adolf Jan Kuczewski.

 

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